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“All the roses of the world won’t be enough for Syrian grief.” 
Walid Jumblatt 
 
The Syrian crisis has entered its fifth year, and there are no signs that the conflict will end soon. On the 
contrary, international and regional behaviour with respect to the Syrian crisis leaves the impression 
that the crisis will be a very long - and bloody - one. According to the United Nations, two hundred and 
twenty thousand Syrians have been killed since the uprising started in March 2011, four million Syrians 
have fled the country, and seven million Syrians are internally displaced.1 The economy is shattered, 
cities and towns have been wiped from the map, chemical weapons have been used multiple times, and 
yet there are no signs that regional or international actors are willing to intervene to end the crisis. 
     Enough work has been done on the causes of the Syrian revolt, with little emphasis regarding the 
reasons behind the prolongation of the war. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to study the reasons 
behind the prolongation of the Syrian crisis. I identify two sets of factors that prolong the crisis, 
classified into regional and international factors. At the regional level, the crisis is portrayed as a 
competition between Iran from one side, and Saudi Arabia and Turkey from another. This competition 
is based on the need to expand or maintain influence in Syria, with Saudia Arabia aiming at re-claiming 
Syria into the Arab orbit, while Iran trying its best to preserve the Syrian regime since it serves as an 
outpost to project its Iranian influence into the Arab Levant. Saudi Arabia and Iran have promoted a 
religious dimension to the conflict for political purposes, ending up in a regional cleavage of Sunni 
States vs. the Shiite axis. The former is led by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, supported by the states of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The latter is composed of Iran and supported by its proxies: Iraqi 
Shiite militants and Hezbollah from Lebanon.  
     At the international level, the regional struggle has elevated into a conflict between Russian-Chinese 
interests from one side and that of the American interests from another. Nevertheless, the two layers of 
the conflict are related by the dependence of the regional players on Russia and the US. The United 
States has been a strong ally of the Sunni states in the Middle East, and without them there cannot be a 
solution to end the war, considering that most of Syria’s population are Sunnis, while the Sunni states 
need American support to articulate a successful policy to finance and arm the rebel groups. The Shiite 
bloc led by Iran needs the Russians and Chinese umbrella to block United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions that might jeopardize their interests, and Russia needs the Iranian manpower (boots 
on the ground) with Russian air-cover to avoid a total collapse of the Syrian regime. 
 
The Syrian Crisis 
     Inspired by the series of Arab uprisings that started in Tunisia early 2011, the Syrian uprising was 
sparked spontaneously in the southern city of Daraa where school children were arrested for writing 
graffiti on their school wall calling for the fall of the regime.2 Consequently, the children were taken by 
the security forces, beaten, tortured and sexually harassed. The brutality was overseen by Atef Najib, 
head of the Political Security branch in Daraa.3 It is said that when tribal leaders from Daraa met with 
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Najib to ask for the release of the children, he deliberately told them that by no means could the children 
be granted freedom for their crime. When one tribal leader took off his kufiya, placed it on the table (a 
tribal custom of threatening to conduct repercussions if no solution is adopted), Najib threw the kufiya 
from the window and followed with curses to the leaders.4 As a result, the first demonstration of Syrians 
opposing Asad started on 18 March 2011 on what was known as the Friday of Dignity.5 
     Opposition to Asad spread like wildfire in different cities which organized peaceful demonstrations 
to demand reforms, but Asad’s response was brutal, ordering the military to open fire at demonstrators. 
After few months of peaceful demonstrations, the Syrian regime pushed the opposition to use weapons 
against the Syrian army. Units from the Syrian army defected and established the Free Syrian Army. 
They took refuge in the northern part of Syria and Turkey. When Asad’s forces were on the defensive, 
they used chemical weapons in al-Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, in August 2013.6 The inability of the 
west to respond swiftly to Asad’s use of chemical weapons emboldened the brutal crackdown on 
protestors.7 This happened less than a week after Obama’s declaration that Asad would cross a red line 
if he used chemical weapons.8 
     In his analysis of the Syrian crisis, David Lesch asserts that the crisis had emerged as a regional cold 
war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and a new Middle Eastern cold war at the international level 
between the U.S and Russia. 9  While I agree on the two levels of the conflict, the regional and 
international cold war hypothesis is debatable. There is a rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but it 
is by no means a cold war; the war is clearly open to escalation and has taken a religious aspect despite 
the fact that the two countries are acting according to national interests rather than religious belief. At 
the international level, Russia and China might be willing to amend their position if less pressure was 
put on their immediate sphere: Russia fears increasing orientation of Eastern Europe towards the west, 
hence threatening Russia’s interest in the region, while China is trying to build its regional hegemony 
in East Asia. Consequently, both countries have a stake in the Syrian crisis to use it as a bargain chip 
vis-à-vis the west to secure their interest not in the Middle East, but rather in their immediate sphere.   
 
The Regional Dilemma 
     The regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia re-emerged to the surface after the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The new political system in Iraq favoured the Shiite majority who aligned 
themselves with Iran, rendering Saudi Arabia to perceive the outcome of the invasion as an Iranian 
success in spreading its influence in the Middle East at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s regional 
leadership. In addition, Syria’s turn to Iran and its spat with the Arab world following the assassination 
of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri made it critical for Saudi Arabia to re-claim its lost interests 
in Syria. 
 
 
 
Iran and the Shiite Bloc 
     The alliance between Iran and Syria began soon after the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.10 
The interest between the two countries to establish such an alliance was twofold: to help contain the 
Iraqi regime which was at war with the Iranians in 1980 and hostile to the Syrian Baʽthist branch, and 
to join forces in order to combat the Israeli influence in Lebanon. From the Iranian perspective, Syria 
became a safe passage for financial and military support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Syria facilitated 
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the infiltration of Iranian Revolutionary Guards to train the newly established Hezbollah in 1982.11 
Later, the success of Hezbollah in forcing the Israeli army to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000 
cemented the relation between Iran and Syria. After 2005, the Arab isolation of the Syrian regime due 
to the assassination Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri fortified the alliance and made Syria heavily 
dependent on Iran. 
     Syria’s turning to Iran was a strategic choice made by Bashar al-Asad. He did not hesitate to insult 
the late Saudi King Abdallah Ban Abdul Aziz in 2006 during the Israeli-Hezbollah war when Asad 
described Abdallah as being half a man. 12  Moreover, under Bashar, Iranian-Shiite influence was 
prioritized over a Sunni-Arab one. Thus, a number of local Shiite channels started broadcasting in Syria, 
lecturing about Shiite Islam and promoting pro-Iranian religious men to media appearances.13 Some 
twenty thousand Iranians have been given Syrian citizenship,14 and economically speaking, Bashar has 
tied Syria to Iran: Iranian direct investment in Syria was estimated at $3 billion as of 2008, Iran opened 
an auto manufacturing plant in Syria with the goal of eventually supplying 40 percent of the Syrian 
automobile market, and it financed a new fleet of buses and helped build numerous mosques around the 
country.15 
     Syrian dependency on Iran was a strategic gain for the latter. Syria became a forward operating post 
and a means for Iran to project power into the Levant.16 Syria is still the safe passage for Iranian military 
and financial support not only to Hezbollah, but also to Hamas. Losing Syria meant that Iranian proxies 
will be weakened, and consequently its influence in the Levant. In addition, the alliance of the two 
autocratic-oriented regimes aimed also to provide what Moises Naim calls “political technology” for 
suppressing their people, whereby states exchange information and strategies that deals with preserving 
authoritarian systems.17 Indeed, when unrest started to spread in Syria, Iran sent elements of its elite 
Qods Force to train Syrian forces on strategies to quell protests, skills the Iranians honed when putting 
down the Green Revolution in 2009.18 The Syrian regime also imported a special Iranian militia to 
protect the government and functions beside the Syrian Republican Guard headed by Bashar’s brother, 
Maher Al Asad.19 Besides that, Iranian proxies in the region started pouring into Syria to support the 
regime, and on 25 May 2013 the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, officially 
announced the role of Hezbollah in fighting the rebels in Syria.20 Iraq offered Damascus moral support 
and signed trade deals with the embattled regime,21 and Iraqi Shiites formed the militant brigade Abi Al 
Fadl Al ‘Abbas, and Afghani Shiites from the Hazara tribe to fight alongside the Syrian regime. 
Economically, Iran is helping Syria defy the UN oil embargo by shipping oil to Syria,22 sending cash to 
the regime and stopping the devaluation of the Syrian currency.23   
     Syria’s geopolitical position as a safe passage to support Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Palestine, 
represents a serious motive for Iran to defend the Syrian regime. As William Harris puts it, Iranian 
involvement in Syria is to make sure that Hezbollah receives its Syrian and Iranian missiles as a 
deterrent against an Israeli assault on Iranian nuclear facilities.24 Moreover, “without Damascus, Iran 
would be shrunk to a defensive position in the Persian Gulf, and even Iraqi Shiite Arabs might look 
elsewhere.25 In other words, Syria is geopolitically imperative for Iranian influence in the region. 
     The Syrian regime survives today mainly because of the material support of Iran and the Russian 
political umbrella. It is widely believed that the lift of sanctions against Iran would provide further 
material boost to the Syrian regime and the Shiite axis in the region. However, Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
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and their allies have a different perspective towards Syria. This Sunni bloc is providing weapons and 
finance to the rebels, albeit in smaller quantities than the amount Iran is providing to the Syrian regime. 
Their stance against Syria is also aimed at clipping Iranian influence in the Middle East. 
 
The Sunni Bloc 
     The Sunni bloc consists of two main players: Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Qatar has a supportive role, 
because it does not have the power of projection the Saudis and Turks have. Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates have a minor role in the conflict exclusive to financing a few rebel groups. The problem 
with this bloc is that it lacks coordination and a coherent policy. Moreover, this bloc is internally divided 
among itself whereby each country has conflicting interests to the others. Till now, no Turkish-Saudi 
unified policy towards Syria has been reached, and the support this bloc is providing to the rebels is 
aimed at preventing their collapse but not their victory. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are wary of each 
other’s influence among the Syrian rebels. Turkey made a common cause with Saudi Arabia in trying 
to bring about regime change in Damascus by providing sanctuary and funds to the rebels.26 However, 
Turkey will not welcome a strong Free Syrian Army associated with Saudi Arabia in its immediate 
neighbourhood.27 The last thing Turkey wants is a Wahhabi oriented Sunni neighbour which can disrupt 
Turkey’s internal social fabric. 
     Beside Turkey’s scepticism of Saudi intentions, it is taking its economic interests with Iran into 
consideration. Turkey and Iran have agreed to expand their bilateral trade agreements to 36 billion USD 
by 2016, and Iran is the second biggest exporter of oil and gas into Turkey.28 Marginalizing Iran 
politically from the Syrian scene may have severe implications for the Justice and Development Party, 
and an economic crisis in Turkey as a result of Iranian-Turkish divergence of perspective regarding the 
Syrian civil war might also put the party out of power for the first time in a decade. Hence, we can 
understand Erdogan’s reluctance in orchestrating a covert operation in Syria despite its unique geo-
political position to secure no-fly zones, safe zones within Syria, and orchestrate the unification of the 
Syrian opposition.29 Needless to say, the Alevi community in Turkey which is overwhelmingly secular 
and is intimidated by Erdogan’s Islamist policies, has taken a staunch stand supporting the Syrian 
regime.30 This makes Erdogan mistrustful of the Alevi community, something manifested in May 2013 
when a car bomb attack on the Turkish-Syrian border, with Edrogan describing it as an event inspired 
by Syrian civil war,31 hinting at the sympathies and possible coordination between the Alevi community 
and Asad’s Alawite regime. 
     Saudi Arabia for its part is trying to completely eradicate Asad’s regime in order to substitute it with 
a friendly Sunni regime that would not compete with Saudi’s influence in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. 
The fall of Asad’s regime would mean the end of a hostile regime, would reverse the loss of Iraq, and 
check Iran’s advance into the Levant.32 For this purpose, the Kingdom is providing financial support to 
all rebel forces it regards suitable for its anti-Iranian cause.33 Saudi financial support, along with the 
Kuwaiti, Emirates, and Qatari financial contribution have been channelled to virtually all the main 
opposition groups, with a major difference that Saudi Arabia does not finance the Islamic State or the 
al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra.34 This is another problem that the Sunni bloc is facing, and that is the 
competition to finance rebel groups who tend to serve the interest of their patrons in the region. Al Nusra 
receives funds from private donations,35 and the competition between donors to fund different rebel 
groups has weakened the armed groups in general and the FSA in particular, which is struggling to 
survive financially and militarily. 
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     Diplomatically, Qatar took the lead in opposing Asad’s rule when it became the first Arab country 
to withdraw its ambassador from Damascus in July 2011, and Qatar’s Prince contemplated the 
intervention of Arab troops to hasten Asad’s removal,36 a bold diplomatic move which fell on deaf ears 
in the Arab League. All the countries in the Sunni bloc lack genuine and audacious initiatives. Despite 
the enormous amount of money, Saudi ability to project power into Syria remains limited,37 and the 
Kingdom is heavily dependent on the U.S. for military action against Syria. When Asad used chemical 
weapons in August 2013, the Saudis tried to convince Obama to use force against Asad but to no avail. 
Instead of taking unilateral action under the umbrella of the Arab League, the Saudis, along with the 
GCC and the Turks are waiting for American blessing. This serves well for Asad and his allies in 
prolonging the war and attempting to crush the rebellion. 
     Looking at the conflict in Syria from a regional perspective, the countries taking part are classified 
as a Shiite axis and a Sunni one. States in the Middle East are giving the conflict a religious dimension 
to cover their national interests which they believe are at stake. This explains the Sunni motivation for 
Jihad in Syria against Asad’s regime, with a desire to bring Shariah law into post-Asad Syria. As for the 
Shiites, they are motivating young men from Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan to fight for the protection 
of Shiite religious shrines, like the holy Shrine of Sayida Zainab, with a divine mission to fight Takfiri 
groups. However, these are political moves aimed at utilizing religion to hide the national and 
geopolitical interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Transcending the factors that contribute to the conflict 
into the international level, it becomes clear that states in conflict are more oriented to define their 
interests in terms of realpolitik. Russia, China, and the U.S. do not need to provide a religious, cultural 
or even humanitarian dimension to protect their interests in Syria, they have enough confidence to define 
their interests in a political context. 
 
The International Perspective: A Bird’s Eye View 
     At the international level, there are two groups that contribute to the prolongation of the conflict. 
The first group consists of Russia and China, while the second group consists mainly of the U.S. which 
seems to be ignoring the situation in Syria in favour of domestic American politics and political action 
in other parts of the world, such as Cuba and the Pacific. 
     It is wrong to consider that Russia, China and Iran have identical interests in Syria. For the time 
being, their interests overlap and are not in conflict, but in the long run, their interest will definitely 
diverge. Russia and China have been acting together to block American led attempts for a solution. In 
October 2011, Russia and China vetoed a sanctions resolution condemning Syria.38 Later on February 
4, 2012, both countries vetoed a resolution by the UNSC calling on Asad to step down and stop the 
violence.39 The following month they also vetoed a draft resolution by the U.N. Human Rights Council 
that condemned the crimes committed by the regime,40 and in July 2012 they vetoed a British draft 
resolution aimed at punishing the Asad regime with economic sanctions.41 During the debates, Russia 
and China closely coordinated their efforts to support the Syrian regime,42 and both provided military 
support, financial and technical assistance to the Syrian army to face international sanctions.43 Finally, 
in 2014, Russia and China vetoed a U.N. move to refer Asad’s crimes in Syria to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).44 The last move was obvious since both countries have been widely criticised by 
international agencies for human rights violations, and they perceive a move to refer crimes to the ICC 
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as a threat to their sovereignty in the future. Recently, Russia has vetoed another UNSC resolution to 
stop the bombings in Aleppo, making it the fifth time that Russia vetoes resolutions regarding Syria.45 
     The degree of Russian commitment to protect its interest in Syria is best represented in its 
intervention on the side of the regime starting in October 2015.46 Originally, Russia claimed that its 
support of the Syrian regime was to face the security threat from Islamists and a possible spill over of 
those groups into the North Caucasus region.47 This argument was not very convincing since it is hard 
for militants to spill over from one region to another separated by thousands of miles. Later in October 
2015, Russia justified its intervention as an act of war against the Islamic State, but the truth is that 
Russian airstrikes have been targeting civilians and opposition groups who have had success in taking 
and holding regions from the Syrian army.48  
     In the Syrian coastal city of Tartous, Russia has its only naval base in the Mediterranean, and the 
facilities have been upgraded by Russian technicians.49 The Mediterranean represents the old dream of 
imperial Russia to reach warm waters, and Russia’s Putin is highly unlikely to let that dream disappear 
for it is crucial to utilize it at the domestic level for the regime’s survival. After the fall of Saddam’s 
regime in 2003 and that of Ghaddafi’s Libya in 2011, Syria became the last remaining ally of Russia in 
the Arab world, and this zealous commitment to defend the Syrian regime is based on two assumptions: 
avoid the Iraqi and Libyan scenario where Russian interests were neglected in forming new regimes in 
these countries, and to use the Syrian card as a bargain chip to protect Russian interests in Ukraine. 
According to Robert Patman, Russia fears that a closer association between the EU and Ukraine could 
accelerate a democratic transition in Ukraine and have spill-over effects for the authoritarian regime in 
Moscow. Putin got involved in the Ukraine in 2014 because he feared that a democratic uprising in the 
Ukraine could have repercussions for Russia’s political system.50 Consequently, I believe that Russia’s 
simultaneous intervention in Syria and Ukraine is to use the former as a bargain chip to prevent further 
connections between Ukraine and the EU. Moreover, with the list of allies growing thinner, preserving 
autocratic regimes and learning how to quell opposition movements is a survival strategy by the axis 
that includes Russia, China, Iran and other countries. This is best explained in Moises Naim thesis about 
dictatorships exchanging political technology to preserve authoritarian systems.  
     At the level of geopolitics, the Russians are using the Syrian crisis as a bargain chip to protect their 
interests in their immediate sphere. The Ukrainian crisis has put the Russian regime on high alert and 
on the defensive. Russia’s economy is weakened, and its influence in Eastern Europe is waning. 
Whether the European Union or  NATO are willing to expand or create a new order in Eastern Europe 
dissociated from Russia economically and politically, Putin knows that such scenarios will eventually 
have severe repercussions on Russian domestic affairs. A failure to preserve Russian power in Eastern 
Europe may destroy his image as a powerful and invincible leader. Hence, Putin can provide 
concessions in Syria in return for important gains in Ukraine. 
     Iran has provided its technical experience to the Syrian regime based on the events of the Green 
Revolution in 2009, and Russia is definitely learning from Syria’s mistakes in dealing with the 
opposition, for one day Putin might face a similar situation and he needs to know how to react. Events 
in Syria provide a rich spectrum on autocratic survival for like-minded politicians and regimes. 
     Russia has economic interests worth twenty billion dollars which come from tourism, energy sector, 
and infrastructure.51 Moreover, Syria depends on the Russian military, making it the seventh largest 
buyer of Russian military equipment in the last decade with 1.5 billion dollars’ worth of military 
purchases.52 It might be, too, that Russia is trying to block any attempt by Qatar to export natural gas to 
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Europe by building a pipeline that passes through Syria, or perhaps Russia itself needs to have a friendly 
regime in Syria to build its own pipeline to the Middle East to diversify its supply. It is too early to 
analyse this point further, but eventually conflicting interest over natural resources will have a say in 
countries that tend to be a strategic passage for exporting-importing natural resources. Nevertheless, 
Russia’s interests in Syria are more than an economic one; as Aleksandr Knovaloc describes it, 
Moscow’s interests in Syria are less economic than political, for Russia is trying to secure its role in the 
shaping of a new Middle East.53 But if this is the strategy Russia is following, then it is unlikely it will 
preserve its influence or interests in the region. Whether in 10 or 20 years, the Syrian regime will fall, 
and the country will not be as powerful as it used to be prior to the crisis. If Russia truly wanted to 
preserve its interests in the region, it would have aimed at neutrality or promoting its interest with the 
opposition. Russia’s support for Syria is more political than economic, it is a matter of regime survival 
in Russia itself. Russia, Iran, Syria, North Korea, China and Venezuela are autocratic regimes. A regime 
change in one of these countries by a popular revolution is likely to inspire the population of the other 
countries to revolt. That is why, for instance, China has opted to block all sites that cover the uprisings 
in the Arab world, and Putin has spent a fair amount of time explaining to Obama how the Middle East 
survives with non-democratic regimes.54 For Putin, this is a sacred alliance that may threaten the very 
heart of his own regime in Moscow. Just as Muhamad Olimat explains it, authoritarian regimes defend 
each other and support each other’s agenda.55 
     Regarding China, its approach to the Syrian crisis is based on pragmatism. For example, 24 hours 
after China cast its veto in February 2012, a delegation from the Syrian National Committee for 
Democratic Change (a key Syrian opposition group) visited Beijing at the invitation of its foreign 
ministry.56 This strategy was aimed at building China’s image as a mediator rather than a partisan in the 
conflict.57 Politically, Chinese interest resides in a prevention of a swift and impressive regime change 
by the Syrian opposition because such an action might encourage separatists in China. The provinces 
of Xingjian, Hong Kong and Tibet are inspired by separatists, and this threatens the stability of the 
Chinese regime,58 because if one province separates, China is likely to disintegrate. Needless to say, the 
more the conflict is prolonged, the more China can learn from Syria’s experience in quelling uprisings. 
     China’s concern in the Syrian conflict is not only based on domestic purposes, it also has to do with 
American alliances in East Asia, an area which China has come to perceive as its immediate sphere. 
Taiwan, Japan, and smaller countries in East Asia are part of the American sphere of influence bordering 
China. Taiwan is aligned with the U.S, but China has historical claims over the island; Japan and China 
have historical enmity and are engaged in a diplomatic struggle regarding the sovereignty over a group 
of small islands between the two countries. It is unclear whether the U.S will intervene to mediate or 
arbitrate between China and Japan regarding the dispute in the South China sea, or whether it will accept 
China’s swallowing of Taiwan. Hence, China also perceives the Syrian conflict as a bargaining chip to 
promote its geopolitical interests in East Asia. According to Mordechai Chaziza, China’s policy in the 
Syrian crisis is influenced by the soft balancing strategy. Pape defines soft balancing strategy as being 
an action that challenges U.S military preponderance indirectly by the use of non-military tools which 
aims at frustrating, and undermining aggressive unilateral U.S military policies.59 By using the power 
of veto and opening up to the Syrian opposition, Beijing is trying to undermine the U.S whilst avoiding 
military conflict and at the same time it is keeping an eye on its immediate sphere. Minor influence in 
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Syria can be transformed into strong gains in East Asia by forcing the Americans to accept Chinese 
predominance in East Asia over Japan, Taiwan and other countries. 
 
The United States 
     The U.S. does not have a comprehensive policy towards the Middle East in general and Syria in 
particular. When the Syrian uprising against Asad began in 2011, Obama asked the Syrian President to 
step down. However, the U.S. has not shown any sign of intervention in Syria against Asad’s forces to 
stop the bloodshed. The American policy towards Syria is based on a diplomatic approach where the 
“Friends of Syria” group was established and includes Arab and Western countries who oppose Asad.60 
Besides this diplomatic pressure, the U.S. and the West in general imposed economic sanctions on the 
Asad regime in an attempt to break the regime.61 In addition, Obama’s administration is being too 
idealistic in trying to manage the Syrian crisis through the UN. The Asad regime is being supported 
economically and militarily by Iranians and Russians, and it is a brutal regime that perceives 
international relations from the hard - not the soft - power perspective. Thus, American emphasis on 
economic sanctions will only empower the regime as it will force citizens to depend on the Syrian state 
to receive welfare and primary material for survival. Moreover, the approach for regime change by soft 
power or coercive diplomacy is an extremely fragile policy in the Middle East. Saddam’s Iraq and the 
Iranian regime have survived economic sanctions, and North Korea has been surviving sanctions for 
decades. Dictatorships understand politics by tangible power, not by soft power. 
     It is understandable that America is still suffering from the consequences of the Afghan and Iraqi 
war launched in the last decade. Hence, it is not enthusiastic about initiating an international alliance 
against Asad without a U.N. mandate, but recent proclamations by Secretary of State John Kerry about 
the need to talk to Asad as a means of pursuing a solution to the crisis62 raises doubts about America’s 
credibility. Moreover, the U.S. need not send troops to overthrow Asad; the West and the U.S. can 
provide important lethal weapons to the opposition and with essential training for their military units.   
     It is clear that the U.S. under Obama has been more interested in reaching a nuclear deal with the 
Iranians rather than stopping bloodshed in Syria or elsewhere. This priority is perceived by the Russians 
and Iranians as a sign of weakness which encourages them to support the Asad regime. The lack of a 
firm American policy regarding Syria has emboldened Iran, Russia, and China to pursue their own 
interests in Syria. The American administration has also neglected the danger of prolonging the war; at 
the regional level, the fighting in Syria is perceived as a Sunni-Shiite conflict. The deeper segmentation 
and antagonism between Sunnis and Shiites across the Muslim World threatens stability in countries 
that have substantial Sunni and Shiite communities, like Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Kuwait and 
Bahrain.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
     The two layers of conflict in Syria, the regional-religious dimension and a realpolitik-international 
dimensions are closely related. The Shiite bloc and its alliance with the Russian-Chinese axis 
demonstrates the overlapping interest of like-minded regimes that are based on authoritarian principles. 
It is likely that China might step out of the Russian-Iranian axis if its regional interests are met in East 
Asia, or if it finds that its economic interests are secured in a post-Asad regime. However, one cannot 
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expect that China will join an anti-Asad coalition, but it can be expected that it will take a neutral stance 
in the future. Iranian and Russian perspectives towards the crisis are based on the need to support like-
minded regimes which provide a safe path for their interests in the Levant. Asad’s recent comments on 
the need of Russia to preserve its influence in the Middle East in order to create a balance of power with 
the West can be framed within this context. 63 
     As for the Turkish-GCC-American axis, it is an alliance that is dependent on the U.S. with the latter 
being reluctant to take a bold initiative. For those who argue that the GCC countries are also 
authoritarian regimes whose interest lies in aligning with other dictatorships, their claim is wrong. This 
is not to say that they are democratic, but the GCC countries represent a social contract based on a 
rentier state whereby the state shares the wealth of the nation abundantly in return for political 
obedience. Its rationale is completely different from that of Russia and Iran. The American 
administration is trying to promote Iran as a regional power at the expense of Saudi Arabia, which will 
definitely lead to further conflicts in the region. Saudi Arabia perceives the crisis in Syria as a Shiite 
threat to the Sunni order led by the GCC, but the efforts of the GCC are still limited, along with the 
Turkish efforts due to their overdependence on American action. Nevertheless, it is likely that when an 
American initiative regarding Syria is put into action, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will manage their 
differences to contain the Shiite influence. It can be said that a new Persian Empire is rising, and due to 
Arab inactivity with respect to the Syrian crisis, it is more likely that it will collide with the Neo-
Ottomanists in Turkey. 
     Any resolution in Syria that does not take into account the Sunni-Shiite balance of power at the 
regional level is likely to be sabotaged in the long run. It is important to find a common ground between 
the regional and international dimensions. A solution which is internationally supported but with 
regional reservations is unlikely to survive, and vice-versa.  Ironically, while all parties are witnessing 
heavy losses in their interests in Syria, only Israel stands in triumph. Without any sort of intervention, 
the Syrian army has been destroyed, the prospect of a strong state on its northern border is eliminated, 
Hezbollah, Israel’s archenemy is losing its best fighters in Syria, hence weakening its ability to fight the 
Israeli army. Moreover, the Sunni-Shiite struggle in the region gives Israel an indirect assurance that its 
borders are secure because the regional powers are busy fighting themselves. 
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